Enhancing the Protection of Civilians through Conventional Arms Control – Challenges and Opportunities for United Nations Peace Operations

This paper explains roles of diplomacy for better UN (United Nations) Peace Operations, major obstacles in the delivery of mandates of UN Peace Missions, inter alia, due to weaknesses in UN peace architecture and thematic new directions in the course of its evolution. The research methodology involves document analysis and review. The sources of data are UN documents on UN Peace Operations and UN Study reports on the same.It finds the inevitable role of diplomacy in leading discourses, designing and deciding mandates of missions. Due to the political nature of conflicts and dynamic nature of global politics, more effective diplomacy is needed both at global and local level. Reviewing UN peace architecture, it finds that UN Peace Operations are largely successful though beset by some key challenges. Further, it explains such thematic new directions as protection of civilians, women peace and security, concern about safety and security of peacekeepers, regionalism, building and sustaining peace, and growing demand for accountability and professionalism. Finally, some findings and implications for diplomats and peacekeepers involved in UN Peace Operations have been drawn.

The Protection of Civilians (PoC) has been part of United Nations (UN) peace operations for twenty years. Today, PoC is irrefutably a ‘centre of gravity’ for how UN peace operations see and portray themselves. Despite negative perceptions, a great deal of progress has been made in how missions prepare for and respond to the demands of protection mandates. For the vulnerable populations they serve, mandates to protect raise expectations and provide hope that peacekeepers will safeguard them. Yet efforts to implement PoC mandates have encountered a range of problems, which peace operations have struggled to address. This article critically reflects on the past two decades of promoting, planning for and practicing protection in UN peace operations. It argues that while the achievements are many, significant challenges remain and much more must be done to deliver on this cardinal obligation.

Security sector reform and the protection of civilians are regular features within United Nations (UN) peace operations. However, the two areas are often distinct from one another in the mandates of missions. What then is the relationship between Security Sector Reform (ssr) and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in contemporary missions and how does ssr impact PoC? This article aims to draw out this relationship by conducting a comparative case study analysis based on three missions that all combine a ssr and PoC mandate: the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (minusma), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (minusca) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (monusco). The case studies provide a variety of examples which demonstrate elements of both convergence and divergence in the implementation of ssr and PoC. With ssr often taking place in a context of armed conflict, the current focus on human rights training and accountability is insufficient as the missions fail to achieve long-term ssr goals and instead must prioritise PoC due to the actions of the host states.

This article examines the contributions of police to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in United Nations (UN) peace operations. Drawing on field research in four missions where police have had to implement PoC mandates in challenging and unprecedented ways, I identify lessons associated with emerging practice. The article contributes to debates about non-military forms of civilian protection arguing that police – at once uniformed and civilian, coercive but also community-oriented – offer unique contributions to PoC. It also highlights the need for a systematic evaluation of what works and what does not for protection through policing to be harnessed in future missions.

1. Touring the Western European Defense Horizon.- 2. Western European Defense: The Next Ten Years.- 3. Future Requirements for Theater Weapons in Western Europe.- Appendix: European Security in the Postwar Period: Documents from 1948-1989.- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.- The North Atlantic Treaty, August 24, 1949.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967.- Speech of M. Laurent Fabius, September 17, 1982.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 9, 1983.- Lord Carrington, Secretary General, on the Alliance, September 21, 1984.- The Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985.- Maintaining Security in a Changing World [United Kingdom, 1988].- Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, March 2-3, 1988.- Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 9-10, 1988.- European Security Cooperation.- Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, March 17, 1948.- Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954.- Franco-German Summit Statement, February 27-28, 1986.- Speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, March 16, 1987.- Arms Control: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.- Treaty between the USA and USSR, December 8, 1987.- Address by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, October 28, 1977.- Communique of a Special NATO Meeting, December 12, 1979.- President Ronald Reagan's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1983.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, October 28, 1983.- Speech by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the SPD Conference, November 19-20, 1983.- Statement by General Secretary Andropov, November 24, 1983.- Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 11, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, November 1987.- North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1987.- Arms Control: Short-Range Nuclear Missiles.- Statement by British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 14, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, May 15, 1987.- Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, June 2, 1987.- Arms Control: Conventional Forces.- Document of the Stockholm Conference, September 19, 1986.- Address of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, June 11, 1986.- Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand, April 23, 1987.- Interview with Jacques Chirac, May 16, 1987.- Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control, May 30, 1987.- Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead, March 2-3, 1988.- Mikhail Gorbachev's Address to the United Nations, December 7, 1988.- Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council, December 8-9, 1988.- Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, January 10, 1989.- Position Paper, March 6, 1989.- Conceptual Framework of Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, March 9, 1989.- Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, April 27, 1989.- President George Bush's Statement, May 29, 1989.- About the Authors.

Canadians take pride in the peacekeeping legacy of their country. Looking back over the history of United Nations (UN) peace operations, episodes that loom large include Lester B. Pearson's role in the creation of the first peacekeeping force, the rapid deployment of Canadian troops to Cyprus, the battles of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Medak Pocket in Croatia, and the actions of Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire as force commander in Rwanda. Until 1989, Canada had participated in every UN mission. In total, Canada contributed more than 10 percent of total UN military personnel deployed since 1947.1The perception of Canada as a leader in UN-led peace operations suffers when juxtaposed against Canada's current troop contributions.3 In October 2007, there were 173 individuals-mostly police-deployed to UN-led peace operations. The number of Canadian forces (CF) personnel deployed to UNled peace operations, at 58, was at its lowest point since the creation of the first peacekeeping force in 1956. Moreover, Canada had no military or police officers located in the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) in New York and no military commanders, police commissioners, or special representatives of the UN secretary general were Canadian.3 These numbers seem to paint a bleak picture of Canada's commitment to UN-led peace operations, particularly when contrasted with the 2774 soldiers Canada contributed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan during the same time period.4 While most NATO operations are UN-mandated, they are not synonymous with UN-led operations. Contributing to one organization's operations to the exclusion of another's can have serious political consequences.It is extremely important for Canada to reenergize its commitment to UN-led peace operations. In light of the recent emphasis on NATO-led operations-particularly since NATO began engaging in out-of-area operations, such as its mission in Afghanistan and its technical support to the African Union (AU) in Darfur-questions have been posed about whether Canada should distance itself from UN-led peace operations, which have come under fire for being too politicized. This view is short sighted. It was fewer than 15 years ago when Canada pulled its forces out of Germany following its reunification and the signature of the conventional forces in Europe treaty, that it was accused of neglecting the alliance in favour of the UN (which was heavily engaged in the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other missions), an accusation that dogged Canada's political engagement at NATO until it made a substantial commitment to the NATO-led international security assistance force in 2003. Canada cannot afford to run the same risk at the UN. With 192 members to NATO's 26 and engagement in a broad array of social, political, cultural, and security issues, the UN will remain Canada's main forum for engaging with the world into the foreseeable future. Even within the security sphere, the UN remains the most relevant forum for a wide variety of security issues that other political organizations simply cannot address: coordination of security actors, civilian police, peacebuilding, human security, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation, security sector reform, refugees, humanitarian aid, and humanitarian relief operations. These aspects of peace operations are areas in which Canada can gain valuable political currency by employing its existing strengths. This can only be accomplished through the UN.This discussion identifies what avenues Canada can take in the midterm to ensure it continues to contribute in a meaningful way to UN-led peace operations. It concludes that Canada can best contribute to UN-led peace operations by augmenting its capacities in the areas of administration, coordination, and training, as well as by ensuring the provision of resources for police tasks, aiding with civilian recruitment, providing leadership in gender integration, and supporting enabling arrangements for mission-essential equipment. …

Literature dealing with civil-military coordination (CIMIC) has mostly been concerned with the relationship between humanitarian actors and their military counterparts. In the United Nations (UN) peace operations context, however, the humanitarian-military interface is only one of several civil-military relationships. This paper is concerned with the question whether a different set of principles and guidelines is required for civil-military coordination in UN peace operations. The question is relevant because almost all the UN principles and guidelines for civil-military coordination have been drafted for the humanitarian-military interface, and most have been generated by the humanitarian community from a humanitarian perspective. In contrast, most contemporary UN peace operations are mandated to manage post-conflict peacebuilding transitions that occur in several phases and that involve many different civilian actors, including but not limited to the humanitarian emergency phase and the humanitarian community. The paper argues that UN CIMIC actions can make a positive contribution to the overall peacebuilding process if the military components' resources, energy and goodwill can be positively channelled in support of the overall mission objectives.

Literature dealing with civil-military coordination (CIMIC) has mostly been concerned with the relationship between humanitarian actors and their military counterparts. In the United Nations (UN) peace operations context, however, the humanitarian-military interface is only one of several civil-military relationships. This paper is concerned with the question whether a different set of principles and guidelines is required for civil-military coordination in UN peace operations. The question is relevant because almost all the UN principles and guidelines for civil-military coordination have been drafted for the humanitarian-military interface, and most have been generated by the humanitarian community from a humanitarian perspective. In contrast, most contemporary UN peace operations are mandated to manage * Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at ACCORD where he is an advisor to the Training for Peace in Africa and the African Civil-Military Coordination programmes. He is a DPhil student with the Department of Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch.

This chapter explores the opportunities, challenges and risks of using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the context of conventional arms control and military confidence-building. First, it briefly reflects upon different theoretical approaches and perspectives on arms control and military confidence-building. Second, it provides a brief overview of existing treaties, regimes and measures in Europe. Finally, the chapter concludes with a few reflections and food for thought on the opportunities, challenges and risks inherent in AI technologies for: (1) the balance of power; (2) analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation; (3) verification and (4) trust-building in conventional arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe. In sum, the chapter argues that the best prospects for AI technologies in conventional arms control and military confidence-building are in the augmentation of human intelligence, while the biggest risks lie in a lack of human oversight and an uncritical reliance on AI systems, as well as in the reduction of the trust-building effects of direct military-to-military contacts.KeywordsConventional arms controlTrustVerificationEarly-warningAugmented intelligenceMilitary-to-military contactsHuman oversight

Based on a state policy perspective, this paper seeks to present the path of Brazil’s participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations, from its genesis in 1947 to the present day, with the intent to comprehend whether there is a progressive and evolutionary pattern in these engagement efforts, and which would be the main challenges, contributions and future orientations to the country in this matter. To this end, in a first moment, the text will bring a conceptual discussion regarding the different definitions and understandings on peace operations. Subsequently, we will analyze the evolution of UN peace operations throughout its 70 years and the Brazilian positions during this period. In a third moment, we will present final considerations, identifying the upcoming challenges and the main possible perspectives for Brazil to engage in future peace operations. The intention, therefore, is to ascertain whether peacekeeping operations, as an instrument of international politics aligned to the guidelines of Brazilian defense and foreign policies, should continue to be supported by Brazil or if new reorientations are necessary as a national strategy.

ABSTRACTThis article analyses the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in conjunction with the Protection of Civilians (POC) in peace operations. It examines where and how the two concepts have challenged, altered, led to reinterpretations and had feedback effects on each other. Drawing on methods from discourse analysis, the article examines their: gradual institutionalization at the United Nations (UN); deployment in the practices of the Security Council; and, influence over the actions of operations in the field. The analysis shows that the R2P has co-evolved with POC and particularly the implementation of POC through UN peace operations. The article illustrates that the emergence of the R2P and the trends in POC in peace operations have cross-fertilised in discourse and practice at the UN regarding the prevention and response to egregious of human rights abuses. It argues that this has influenced their respective trajectories with ramifications for understanding the normative trajectory and status of the R2P as it enters its third decade in popular lexicon. In particular, it posits that understanding the current and future status of the R2P will be enhanced by insights into how the R2P has shaped, but also been shaped by, other contiguous normative agendas, thematic areas and practices.

This article argues that the overwhelming historical evidence leads to the conclusion that past efforts at arms control and forced disarmament have been unsuccessful. When ignoring the underlying political disputes of relations between states, arms control and disarmament efforts have tended to be short‐lived, e.g., the interwar period. The authors argue that where these efforts have been successful (e.g., the disarmament regime established by the Protocol to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 concerning the Federal Republic of Germany), the key has been that verification regimes have been accepted as legitimate by all parties. Regarding contemporary Europe, it would appear that the CFE treaty and the numerous CSBM arrangements effected between European and North American states have the essential elements of success, however, long term vigilance regarding verification will be required.

In 2010 improved relations between Russia and the United States, the signing of the New START treaty and efforts to surmount obstacles on the European security agenda ‘reset’ conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Proposals made in 2010 on the two tracks of European arms control dialogue, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe regime and the Vienna Document on CSBMs, will inform future work. Arms control in Europe depends on the strategic interests of its main actors. Elsewhere, the relevance of the Treaty on Open Skies was reaffirmed at its second review conference.

In this article, I aim to explore the interpretation and implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates authorising the protection of civilians (PoC) and, in particular, the meaning of an authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Over the past two decades, the UN Security Council has repeatedly provided UN (mandated) peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In doing so, it has typically authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the aforementioned objective. This PoC language has been subject to varying interpretations and implementations in practice and is therefore often considered ambiguous. The conclusion reached in this article is that PoC language is indeed vague, but that this is not necessarily problematic. It might even be unavoidable in light of the cascade structure in which the PoC mandate is placed and whereby the PoC mandate is interpreted and implemented at the various levels of authority, command, and control. What is problematic is that there is uncertainty and discussion about the limits to the use of force in the implementation of PoC mandates. After all, the formula to use ‘all necessary means’ cannot be regarded as a ‘blank cheque’ to use any amount of force. Therefore, I identify the upper limit to what UN (mandated) peace operations may lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’. I also detect an emerging lower limit for what UN (mandated) peace operations must lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with such a PoC mandate.

The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.