Enhancing Green Port Construction through Advanced Computing: An Evolutionary Game Model under Social Accountability and Government Supervision

Abstract

Ports, as pivotal hubs for global resource consumption and pollution emissions, have garnered considerable attention in the pursuit of sustainability. Despite the Chinese government’s efforts in promoting the green construction of ports and a growing public awareness of environmental protection, progress remains sluggish, with pollution and energy consumption issues still rampant. This paper introduces an evolutionary game model that leverages advanced computing techniques, including big data analytics and simulation, to optimize green port construction strategies, supervision, and enforcement under the lens of social accountability. By applying the Jacobi matrix for analyzing equilibrium paths at diverse initial settings and conducting simulations under various scenarios of punishment intensity and social accountability probabilities, this study unveils that high social accountability likelihoods naturally incentivize ports towards green practices. Conversely, in low accountability scenarios, differentiated outcomes emerge from imposing penalties on ports and local governments. Notably, increasing penalties on ports substantially elevates green construction standards, whereas local government penalties exhibit only transient efficacy. Furthermore, leveraging artificial intelligence for predictive analysis and simulation demonstrates the critical role of technological advancements in enhancing green port construction. The study proposes augmenting penalties on ports, amplifying social oversight, and diminishing green construction costs via port consortia as strategic measures to expedite China’s transition to green ports.