Enhancing compliance among channel members by modeling reward events: matching motivation and ability with model selection

Abstract

Enhancing compliance among channel members is a core, challenging issue in channel management. Building upon social comparison theory, we argue that distributors’ compliance with channel programs may hinge upon their motivation and their perceived ability to comply. To enhance distributors’ compliance level, manufacturers can proactively model reward events to positively influence observing distributors. Our empirical results from one experiment and one field survey confirm that, if distributors lack motivation to comply with the channel program, manufacturers should model a high-performance distributor as a reward recipient, which enhances observers’ compliance through a decrease in perceived financial uncertainty. In contrast, if distributors perceive themselves as having a low ability to comply with the channel program, manufacturers should model a mediocre-performance distributor as the reward recipient, which enhances observers’ compliance through an increase in perceived goal attainability.