Abstract
We studied the prisoner’s dilemma game as applied to signed networks. In signed networks, there are two types of links: positive and negative. To establish a payoff matrix between players connected with a negative link, we multiplied the payoff matrix between players connected with a positive link by −1. To investigate the effect of negative links on cooperating behavior, we performed simulations for different negative link densities. When the negative link density is low, the density of the cooperator becomes zero because there is an increasing temptation payoff, b. Here, parameter b is the payoff received by the defector from playing the game with a cooperator. Conversely, when the negative link density is high, the cooperator density becomes almost 1 as b increases. This is because players with a negative link will suffer more payoff damage if they do not cooperate with each other. The negative link forces players to cooperate, so cooperating behavior is enhanced.
Highlights
Game theory has been applied in many areas, such as economics, ecology, politics, and behavioral science
We extend the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game to a signed network
When we introduce the signed network, we observe that the cooperating state reappears at the high value of a control parameter
Summary
Game theory has been applied in many areas, such as economics, ecology, politics, and behavioral science. Gong et al introduced reputation-based co-evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games They reported that the massive scale of reputation fluctuation helps to enhance the cooperative effect on different network topologies [24]. Tan and Lu reported evolutionary game dynamics in a signed network [26] They observed minimization of structural conflicts when players adjusted their choice of alliance. Lin et al considered a game where two stubborn agents compete to maximize the expected number of non-stubborn agents adopting their opinions in the signed network [30] They observed that a stubborn agent can increase the payoff by selecting a suitable non-stubborn agent to connect to. When there are no signed links, the evolutionary spatial dynamics shows a phase transition from a cooperating state to a defecting state at a critical point.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
