Enhanced management information disclosure responsibilities and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from the accountability system for errors in China

Abstract

Enhancing management's responsibility for information disclosure can improve a firm's risk-taking by improving its resource allocation efficiency, but it can also reduce firm risk-taking by increasing managers' risk aversion. After the regulation change from the China Securities Regulatory Commission to require the listed companies to establish an accountability system for material errors in information disclosure of annual reports (hereinafter referred to as the “accountability system for errors”) in late 2009, the risk of misreporting became substantially higher. This paper explores how the accountability system for errors with strengthened management's responsibility for information disclosure affects corporate risk-taking. We find that the accountability system for errors significantly reduces corporate risk-taking, especially idiosyncratic risk, and the impact is greater in firms with short-term CEO tenure and high-tech firms. The improved information environment and increased market pressure are the mechanisms by which the accountability system for errors reduces corporate risk-taking. Further research shows that after the policy change, firms reduce R&D expenditures and output and are more likely to diversify risk through fixed asset investment and diversified mergers and acquisitions. After establishing the accountability system for errors, the higher level of risk-taking will lead to lower CEO compensation and a higher probability of CEO dismissal. This paper enriches the research on corporate governance reform related to strengthening management responsibility. Our research also provides references and guidance for relevant regulatory authorities and listed companies in emerging markets to improve their corporate governance.