Abstract
The authentication of the navigation signals can be considered as the contribution of the system to the robustness against spoofing attacks and it is becoming an important requirement for a growing number of user communities. GPS and Galileo systems are proposing evolutions of their civil signals to embed features of authentication. For Galileo, the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is integrated in the Galileo E1 OS signal. For the GPS, the Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) solution, designed for the GPS L1C signal, is foreseen to be tested soon. On the other hand, suitable signal processing techniques can be implemented inside the receiver to monitor the quality of the received signals and protect against spoofing attacks. Such techniques shall work as a complement to the authentication strategies, to further increase the signals’ robustness. Within this context, the paper presents the Joint Chimera/OSNMA scheme , designed to be adopted by a multi-constellation receiver that already exploits both OSNMA and Chimera enhancements. The idea is to further strengthen the robustness with respect to the individual use of the two solutions, to tackle sophisticated spoofing attacks, which are able to avoid detection from navigation message authentication (NMA) techniques. The manuscript proves the high performance of the joint scheme, presenting the results of a wide bench of tests, under different scenarios of spoofing, and user conditions.
Highlights
The signal structure of civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals is open to the public domain, as for example for the E1 Open Service Galileo signal [1] and the GPS L1 C/A code [2]
This paper presents a technique to be implemented inside the receiver, and able to take advantage of the two system authentication enhancements
If the solution is further completed by an spreading code authentication (SCA), as in the proposed joint Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) and Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) scheme, resilience is further increased, enabling signal replay detection [10]
Summary
The signal structure of civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals is open to the public domain, as for example for the E1 Open Service Galileo signal [1] and the GPS L1 C/A code [2]. SCA methods work at the chips level and are accomplished with the insertion of unpredictable chips within the nominal spreading code, verifiable by the receiver through proper cryptographic functions Both GPS and Galileo are proposing evolutions of their civil signals to embed features of authentication. If the solution is further completed by an SCA, as in the proposed joint Chimera and OSNMA scheme, resilience is further increased, enabling signal replay detection [10] After this introduction, the paper is organized as follows: section II recaps the main working principles of Chimera and OSNMA services, while section III presents the Joint scheme, along with the details on the procedure for the calibration phase.
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