Abstract
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in hierarchy are very popular in economics and in management sciences. This study extends the model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. This paper highlights hierarchy selection model and we show that the hierarchy selection games are more stable without structures in this paper. Furthermore, an example in industrial organization is given to rationally explain the theory in this work. Key words: Fitness, fixation probability, invasion, game theory, economics, hierarchy, evolutionary game.
Highlights
INTRODUCTIONEvolutionary dynamics, which have been traditionally studied in biological field and are recently focused on, are considered with finite populations (Liebermat et al, 2005; Taylor et al, 2004; He and Cui, 2007)
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in hierarchy are very popular in economics and in management sciences
This study extends the model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
Summary
Evolutionary dynamics, which have been traditionally studied in biological field and are recently focused on, are considered with finite populations (Liebermat et al, 2005; Taylor et al, 2004; He and Cui, 2007). In Nie (2007), evolutionary dynamic games are extended to economic fields and some economic phenomena are rationally explained. In China there exist national government, provinces, counties and so on in hierarchy and the higher rank government (mainly) determines the lower rank governments. This paper is organized as follows: a type of selection games in Taylor et al (2004), which is extended to hierarchy structure, is analyzed and extended to economic field. The fixation probability of selection games in hierarchy structure is considered.
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