Abstract
Conceptual engineers aim to revise rather than describe our concepts. But what are concepts? And how does one engineer them? Answering these questions is of central importance for implementing and theorizing about conceptual engineering. This paper discusses and criticizes two influential views of this issue: semanticism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change linguistic meanings, and psychologism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change psychological structures. I argue that neither of these accounts can give us the full story. Instead, I propose and defend the Dual Content View of Conceptual Engineering. On this view, conceptual engineering targets concepts, where concepts are understood as having two (interrelated) kinds of contents: referential content and cognitive content. I show that this view is independently plausible and that it gives us a comprehensive account of conceptual engineering that helps to make progress on some of the most difficult problems surrounding conceptual engineering.
Highlights
Conceptual engineers think that philosophy should involve the critique and improvement of the concepts we use—both within and outside of philosophy
The basic idea behind this view is that conceptual engineering is concerned with concepts, which I take to be mental representations with dual contents: referential content on the one hand, and cognitive content on the other
This paper focuses on conceptual engineering in the narrow sense
Summary
Conceptual engineers think that philosophy should involve the critique and improvement of the concepts we use—both within and outside of philosophy. Semanticism and psychologism both run the risk of detaching semantic facts from linguistic practices, which can lead to confusion and miscommunication To avoid these unwanted consequences, and to turn conceptual engineering into a means of achieving both the semantic and the practical goal, a hybrid view is needed. The basic idea behind this view is that conceptual engineering is concerned with concepts, which I take to be mental representations with dual contents: referential content on the one hand, and cognitive content on the other.. I will argue that by viewing conceptual engineering as operating on concepts with dual contents, we can accommodate both the semantic and the practical goal at once.
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