Engaged Elites Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission Enforcement

Abstract

The subject of this article is a classic one in European law and administration: the general powers of the Commission to take infringement proceedings against the Member States. The topic merits a basic reconsideration by reason of contemporary developments that put in question the role and nature of the process. Emphasis is laid on the challenges to an e´lite model of regulatory bargaining, in the form both of demands for citizen ‘voice’ and pressures for a firmer and more formal approach to Commission enforcement. The dynamic character of the process is seen in part to reflect different institutional attitudes, with particular attention being paid to the stance of the European Ombudsman. Practical proposals include a re‐balancing of Commission procedures to improve the position of complainants, a central role for the principle of complementarity in terms of public and private legal action, and a creative application to the Commission of the disciplines of the New Public Management. A further aim of the article is to demonstrate the utility of socio‐legal studies in European administrative law: for many years a retarded, insufficiently theorised discipline, with too narrow a court‐oriented focus.