Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of disclosure enforcement mechanisms (such as SEC enforcement teams and corporate governance systems) in directing the disclosure practices of managers when the information is used by shareholders to monitor the manager. The paper establishes a role for a disclosure enforcement system by showing that in its absence it is impossible to simultaneously induce a manager to adopt the desirable disclosure strategy and use the disclosure efficiently to monitor him. The paper shows how the effectiveness of the disclosure enforcement system and the cost of disclosure influence (i) the economic viability of the disclosure enforcement system, (ii) the disclosure policy of the manager, and (iii) the value of including stock options in the manager's compensation package.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
