Enforcement and public opinion: the perceived legitimacy of rule of law sanctions

Abstract

ABSTRACT The EU has powerful enforcement mechanisms to curb democratic backsliding and support the rule of law in its member states. While (the threat of) enforcement is necessary, sanctions might be difficult to accept as legitimate when they hurt a citizen's country. We study the perceived legitimacy of EU enforcement actions. We develop hypotheses about the influence of national identity, party support, procedural fairness, descriptive norm prevalence, and the likely effects of the sanctions on the future of cooperation. These hypotheses are tested with a survey experiment administered to a nationally-representative sample in Poland. The focus is on the substantial financial sanctions imposed by the EU concerning judicial independence. The results show that exclusive national identity, the perceived importance of the rule of law, support for European integration and party support are strongly associated with perceived legitimacy. Providing information about the prevalence of public support for judicial independence in the country increases significantly the perceived legitimacy of enforcement actions. We find no evidence for effects of arguments about Polexit, future deterrence effects of the sanctions or their procedural (un)fairness. EU sanctions might not lead to further backlash among the domestic public, but they are unlikely to generate public pressure for reforms.