Energy storage by improving energy-efficiency of electricity home appliances under governmental supporting policies: A game-theoretic approach

Abstract

In this study, a supply chain is considered including the government, a monopolistic supplier, two manufacturers, two agencies, and customers. The manufacturers produce two substitutable electricity home appliances, i.e., energy-efficient and inefficient products, and sell them to customers via their agencies. The supplier provides industrial and household energies for the manufacturers and customers, respectively. The government sets the tax rates to the members and customers. Furthermore, it promotes the energy-efficient product by lowering the tax rates levied on its manufacturer and agency. In return, the customers' demands for both products are determined based on the selling prices to customers, the household energy consumption costs, and the efficiency rate of the energy-efficient product. Then, the game-theoretic frameworks are applied to make decisions under various competitive scenarios and different power structures. Finally, decisions are discussed and several insights are revealed. It is concluded that Nash game leads to higher utilities achieved by the government and customers. The government and customers' utilities increase by supporting the energy-efficient product. The members and government benefit from increasing the efficiency rate of the energy-efficient product. Moreover, from the whole system's perspective, it is preferable to reduce the tax rate imposed by the government on the members.