Energy Policy in Italy: Contingent Emergency and Structural Weakness

Abstract

In 2006, the energy question—and in particular the natural gas emergency that will be discussed here—was brought to the attention of public opinion, of political and economic debate, and of the electoral contest. First, it needs to be made clear that on both sides, and within the two coalitions, demagoguery prevailed over pragmatism. Similarly, the propensity to demonize the proposals of opponents tended to hold sway over attempts to contribute constructively to the discussion. Thus, a game of mutual vetoes and false propositions took place, characterized by erroneous diagnoses aimed solely at avoiding the electoral costs that the required choices would have imposed. This had the inevitable result of confusing public opinion, which should be aware of the issue, and feeding the general “right of veto,” which, since before the reform of Title V of the Constitution, has allowed anyone to prevent others from doing anything—with the result that nothing happens.