Abstract

Abstract States often use covert operations to undermine their adversaries. This strategy involves, among other methods, intelligence organizations directing and supporting the operations of covert networks residing within the target state. This was a common occurrence during the Cold War, but covert clients also operate in modern conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere. This paper introduces and defines covert clients as a distinct and novel concept. We then use original data on more than 250 clandestine networks within the French Resistance to investigate the determinants of covert client success and failure. We find that clients founded by foreign operatives inserted into the target state fail at significantly higher rates than those that establish themselves organically within the target state, although this effect diminishes among stronger groups. We corroborate these findings with a case study of the Prosper network to demonstrate how clandestine group origins influence their local knowledge, incentives, and security practices. This study uses original data to provide novel insights into clandestine group survival by linking survival to group origins. In demonstrating the potential utility of focusing on the conduct of covert operations, we also contribute to a rapidly growing international relations literature on how states project power through covert action.

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