Abstract
This paper complements the existing literature on endogenous timing in mixed duopoly models by assuming that there is a private firm and a partly privatized one in the market. It is shown that the endogenous timing of the game depends on both the partially privatized firm degree of privatization and the existing product differentiation. However, the obtained results assuming Cournot competition are quite different to those obtained under Bertrand competition.
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