Abstract
Microeconomic theory can serve at least two useful functions in the development of a coherent theory of political economy. First, the logic of individual choice is developed in detail. Second, microeconomic theory may provide a useful framework for the analysis of the economic interests of social actors. While the formal theory of social choice has received considerable development in political science, there is considerably less research explicitly endogenizing political decisions. This paper examines a recent body of research by economists which does attempt to link rational choice with explicit assumptions about economic interests in an attempt to endogenize tariff policy. It is suggested that this line of research is potentially fruitful, but that greater attention needs to be given to the institutional assumptions on both the demand and supply sides of the market for political outputs.
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