Abstract
Abstract Preferences are endogenous to the legal regime when they are shaped by it, as they would be when populist legislation makes people more envious. Legal rules might also shape our preferences when they are taken to provide a persuasive moral guide, as where civil rights legislation weakens prejudices. However, legislative attempts to shape preferences can be abusive, as the experience with Canadian human rights codes shows. Default rules, which presume that we will make a particular choice unless we opt out, importantly affect how we choose, and this has been thought to make a case for “libertarian paternalism”. However, default rules are not libertarian unless they mimic the kinds of choices people would prefer if they thought about it; and in that case they're not paternalistic.
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