Abstract
In the context of a beauty contest coordination game (in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari- 3 ous informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it 4 identifies the state) and a clarity (how easy it is to understand). The unique linear 5 equilibrium has interesting properties: the signals which receive attention are the 6 clearest available, even if they have poor underlying accuracy; the number of sig- 7 nals observed falls as the complementarity of players' actions rises; and, if actions 8 are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium 9 is more public in nature. The consequences of rational inattention constraints on 10
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