Abstract
The termination of the Second Lebanon War (2006) is among the most unusual in wars between Israel and Arab states. A classic example of an asymmetrical confrontation between a sovereign state and a guerrilla organization controlling part of a neighbouring state and operating against its will by means of terrorism, the war had far-reaching ramifications for Israeli decision makers in terms of defining the enemy and setting the termination goals of the conflict. In this respect great significance is attributed to the influence of the interface between the military and political echelons on formulating the war's termination strategy, especially in light of the high status enjoyed by the military in Israeli democracy.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
