Enactivism and neonatal imitation: conceptual and empirical considerations and clarifications.

Paul Lodder,Michiel Van Elk,Mark Rotteveel

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00967

Abstract

Recently within social cognition it has been argued that understanding others is primarily characterized by dynamic and second person interactive processes, rather than by taking a third person observational stance. Within this enactivist view of intersubjective understanding, researchers differ in their claims regarding the innateness of such processes. Here we proposed to distinguish nativist enactivists—who argue that studies on neonatal imitation support the view that infants already have a non-mentalistic embodied form of intersubjective understanding present at birth—from empiricist enactivists, who claim that those intersubjective processes are learned through social interaction. In this article, we critically examine the empirical studies on neonate imitation and conclude that the available evidence is at least mixed for most types of specific gesture imitations. In the end, only the tongue protrusion imitation appears to be consistent across different studies. If neonates imitate only one single gesture, then a more parsimonious explanation for the tongue protrusion effect could be put forward. Consequently, the nativist enactivist claim that understanding others depends on second person interactive processes already present at birth seems no longer plausible. Although other strands of evidence provide converging evidence for the importance of intersubjective processes in adult social cognition, the available evidence on neonatal imitation calls for a more careful view on the innateness of such processes and suggests that this way of interacting needs to be learned over time. Therefore the available empirical evidence on neonate imitation is in our view compatible with the empiricist enactivist position, but not with the nativist enactivist position.

Highlights

IntroductionTake for instance a game with three people in which person A reads a message and has to transfer it to person B, who, after receiving the message has to transfer it to person C
In the present paper we investigate whether the available empirical evidence for neonatal imitation poses a potential problem for the validity of the nativist enactivist claim that understanding others depends on second person interactive processes that are already present at birth
This conclusion provides a potential problem for the nativist enactivist proposal that neonates already have a basic and innate form of intersubjective understanding at birth

Summary

Introduction

Take for instance a game with three people in which person A reads a message and has to transfer it to person B, who, after receiving the message has to transfer it to person C The difficulty in this game, is that person A and C are not allowed to interact directly and all attendants are not allowed to use spoken language. Person C’s interpretation differs considerably from the original message, but surprisingly often the interpretation lies close to the original message This example illustrates that human interaction requires us to understand each other’s actions, but it shows that we are pretty good at it, even in complex situations where we cannot use all available channels of communication. How exactly are we able to understand actions of other people?

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Discussion

Conclusion