En

Miguel López-Astorga

doi:10.18012/arf.2016.28457

Abstract

In the late twentieth century, the final version of the mental logic theory was presented. That was a syntactic and formal approach intended to describe and explain the human inferential ability. Maybe because of several experimental results achieved during the last years that have not addressed by the theory, it can be thought that its framework is outdated today. In this paper, I try to update some particular aspects of the mental logic theory by taking recent empirical evidence and arguments coming from the specialized literature into account. Such aspects refer to the symbols that it should adopt, its actual essential schemata, and the way in which the theory can deal with denials.

Highlights

Maybe because of several experimental results achieved during the last years that have not addressed by the theory, it can be thought that its framework is outdated today
The proponents of the mental logic theory provided its last version in 1998, in particular, in the book edited by Martin Braine and David O’Brien that very year (Braine & O’Brien, 1998a)
It is obvious that the idea of a mental logic on the human mind can still be considered

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The proponents of the mental logic theory provided its last version in 1998, in particular, in the book edited by Martin Braine and David O’Brien that very year (Braine & O’Brien, 1998a). The most important part of the framework, i.e., the part referring to the mental propositional logic does seem to be absolutely completed if all of the chapters of the book are taken into account In this way, the final text presented by Braine and O’Brien shows a syntactic or formal theory that, to a large extent, is able to account for human reasoning. What the theory does not admit is that any formula can be deduced from an incompatibility, and it does not accept this because, as shown by empirical evidence, the human mind does not work in this way This is a very relevant point that distinguishes 98ML from standard logic, and that appears to make it akin to paraconsistent logics such as that of Bolzano (1837).

A PROPOSAL OF SYMBOLS FOR RFT

16 THE FIVE CORE SCHEMATA OF RFT

CONCLUSIONS