Abstract
Gordon Tullock’s insights have revolutionized the analytical framework of economists and political scientists. Both independently and with coauthor James M. Buchanan and others, Tullock (1922-2014) made seminal contributions to the economic theory of majority voting, constitutions, rent seeking, fiscal federalism, bureaucracy, government action to redistribute income, demand revelation, bio-economics, monetary history, and in law and legal systems with focus on the economic analysis of pollution, crime, punishment, and litigation. Tullock applied his economic perspective of homo economicus to the common law versus the codified law and the economics of juries. His innovative use of the economic paradigm to areas considered outside standard economics, often led him to unexpected outcomes, which laid the groundwork for streams of research to be carried by others. Whether by neglect or purpose, Tullock did not explicitly articulate the connection of the various elements of his nonconventional economics into a general system. This paper explores some of Tullock’s unconventional work within the context of his contributions to the development of Public Choice and the broader Virginia school of political economy.
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