Abstract
A computer hijacked by a malware may pretend that it is normal as usual and retrieve secrets from storage of itself and other victim computers. By adopting trusted computing technology a computer’s former health status cannot be forged. Computers can thus detect the change of health status of a hijacked computer and prevent the leakage of the secrets. As Trusted Computing Group (TCG) proposed Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification, IBM implemented software TPM (sTPM) and utilities for engineer who wants to learn the operating principle of TPM. Meanwhile, the blooming of tiny size, but powerful, computers, e.g. Raspberry Pi 2 (Rpi2), attract ones to develop some dedicated applications on the computers. In this article, we report the verified steps for installing new sTPM version on RPi2. After the installation, we also test the functionality and evaluate the performance of the sTPM with some major TPM Commands. The real behaviour of and the traffic between the host computer and the emulated TPM can thus be learned easily.
Highlights
INTRODUCTIONA computer consistently behaves in expected ways is called a trustable computer. To assure that, the health status of the computer must be verifiable and unforgeable
The health status of the computer must be verifiable and unforgeable. This requires a hardware component that reports the health status encrypted with its private key inaccessible from the rest of the hardware component
Given the complexity of TPM2’s functionality and that it is not compatibility with TPM1.2, new software stack, the TPM2 Software Stack (TSS2) and a command interpreter, TPM2_TOOLS to deal with the complicated functions and their arguments. The former translates each TPM2 command into a byte stream in a format called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) command transmission interface (TCTI) while the latter provides command line interface and APIs to ease the use of the TPM commands
Summary
A computer consistently behaves in expected ways is called a trustable computer. To assure that, the health status of the computer must be verifiable and unforgeable. There is no way that a malware can forge the report since that the only way to modify health status register is to extended-hash that only the TPM chip has the private key to sign the report. Given the complexity of TPM2’s functionality and that it is not compatibility with TPM1.2, new software stack, the TPM2 Software Stack (TSS2) and a command interpreter, TPM2_TOOLS to deal with the complicated functions and their arguments The former translates each TPM2 command into a byte stream in a format called TPM command transmission interface (TCTI) while the latter provides command line interface and APIs to ease the use of the TPM commands. The kits to install TSS2 and TPM2-tools can be found on GitHub [5]; sTPM2.0 source can be found on IBM’s website[6] Both computers must install the same supporting package for TPM2.0 before installing above software. TPM2.0 software (TSS2, TPM2-TOOLS, and sTPM2.0) needs twenty-two packages to work properly on Linux operating system.
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More From: International Journal of Security, Privacy and Trust Management
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