Empty institutions, non-credibility and pastoralism: China’s grazing ban, mining and ethnicity

Abstract

When institutional function is disregarded in property rights reforms, there may be two outcomes. One, the new institution grows detached from actors’ praxis and evolves into an ‘empty institution’, allowing those governing to enforce without enforcing, while those governed can continue what they did. Two, the institution evolves into a ‘non-credible’ institution, which may collapse or change due to rising conflict. The concepts are applied to China’s Grazing Ban, a profound measure to regulate the nation’s largest land resource: grassland. A survey and interviews in 11 villages in Northwest China demonstrate that most herders feel that a ban is not appropriate for conservation. Over half perceive negative ecological change, while there are complaints over adverse income effects. More than one-third admit to illegal (night-time) grazing, leading to conflicts between enforcers and herders. The ban’s lack of credibility may be attributed to its disregard of the function of land for social welfare. Through an institutional analysis of grassland reforms, it is demonstrated that the state's reasons to keep imposing the ban are as much driven by ecological conservation as by the need to ascertain control over a vast frontier endowed with mineral reserves and inhabited by ethnic minorities.