Empirical science and value assumptions: Lessons from C. G. Jung

Abstract

The impact of Carl Jung's discussion of psychic phenomena is well known. In 1937, he was invited by Yale University to deliver the Terry Lectures on "Psychology and Religion." On that occasion and many times thereafter, he stated: "Notwithstanding the fact that I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist and adhere to the phenomenological standpoint." Throughout his writings, Jung laid great stress upon the fact that he was primarily an empirical scientist. For example, in Psychology and Religion he set forth the theoretical limitations of his perspective. "Inasmuch as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I am dealing with it from a purely empirical point of view; that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I refrain from any application of metaphysical or philosophical considerations. I do not deny the validity of other considerations, but I cannot claim to be competent to apply them correctly."1 Unlike Freud, Jung readily acknowledged the function of philosophy in calling attention to unacknowledged assumptions. As he said: "It was a great mistake on Freud's part to turn his back on philosophy. Not once does he criticize his premises or even the assumptions that underlie his personal out look. ... I have never refused the bittersweet drink of philosophical criticism, but have taken it with caution, a little at a time. ... At any rate, philosophical criticism has helped me to see that every psychology?my own included?has the character of a subjective confession."2 For an empirical investigator, Jung had a great deal to say about metaphys ics. Further, these statements are remarkable for their ambiguity. In my opinion, Jung's writings express a number of inconsistencies, views that are incompatible with one another. At times Jung maintained that psychology and