Empirical Clinical Practice: A Critical Analysis

Abstract

ONE OF THE MOST significant developments in social work over the past 15 years has been the establish ment of the empirical clinical practice (ECP) model. This model has been pro moted as a way of elevating the profes sionalism of practitioners and fostering the development of a social work knowl edge base (Bloom, 1978; Briar, 1980; Grinnell & Siegel, 1988; Jayaratne & Levy, 1979). Arguments for the adop tion of ECP rest on claims to superiori ty in three interrelated areas: objec tivity, accountability, and ethics. The persuasiveness of these arguments is evident in the large number of educa tional programs that now prescribe training in this approach as a require ment for a social work degree. Concurrent with the development of the ECP model has been the emergence of a literature critical of the positivist orientation toward research and practice that is reflected in ECP and related ap proaches (Haworth, 1984; Heineman, 1981; Witkin, 1989a). Critiques of ECP have tended to focus on particular as pects of the model, such as its use of single-case designs or its usefulness for practice (Kagle, 1982; Ruckdeschel & Farris, 1981; Thomas, 1978). The meta theoretical justifications (the underlying epistemological and ontological assump tions) of the model rarely have been ad dressed in relation to its areas of claimed superiority. This article examines the justifications for the ECP approach in terms of its own methodological claims and metatheoretical assumptions.