Abstract
In his recent work, Michael Slote argues that empathy is what Hutcheson called ‘the moral sense’, the basic source of moral knowledge. The most innovative argument he offers for this is based on the semantic thesis that our empathic reactions play a crucial role in fixing the reference of moral terms. In this paper, I argue that in virtue of its well-motivated departures from Kripke’s original account, Slote's bold proposal faces the main problems of analytical naturalism, as well as some of its own. I suggest that empathy may nevertheless play a more modest and indirect role in acquiring moral knowledge.
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