Emotions and the Actions of the Sage: Recommendations for an Orderly Heart in the "Huainanzi"

Abstract

In this article I want to formulate a general 'theory' of emotions, as it is found in the Huainanzi, a book of political philosophy written at the royal court of Liu An and presented to Emperor Wu of the Han in 139 B.C. There is no term in the Huainanzi that corresponds exactly to our word 'emotion', but the text makes ample reference to mental states that in Western discourse would be classified as emotions: anger, joy, hate, love, desire, sadness, and so on.1 I will use 'emotions' as a term designating such mental states. Nu 'anger' and yu 'desire' are the two emotions that will figure prominently in my discussion. The Huainanzi is a post-Warring States text that in terms of goals, methodology, and the sources upon which it draws connects closely with many of the pre-Han traditions.2 It shares with these traditions an ambivalent attitude toward emotions. Emotions, in most ancient Chinese texts, are seen and accepted as facts of life, as properties shared by all human beings.3 They are also found to be deeply disturbing. The power they can exert over human judgment and action is seen as a hindrance for humans as they strive to attain sagehood. Thus, for example, in a conversation with Gongsun Chou, in Mencius 2A2, Mencius posits having an unmoved or unmoving heart (bu dong xin) as a conditio sine qua non for sagehood.4 Mencius' statement about the unmoved heart bears directly on the topic of emotions. The verb dong 'to move' in his phrase resonates nicely with the 'motion' contained in the English word 'e-motion' (and its Latin roots). The organ affected in Mencius' phrase is the 'heart' xin, for ancient Chinese the locus of all mental processes, including those involved in judgment and action. I will interpret Mencius' statement as a general recommendation not to allow states such as anger, joy, hate, love, and desire to interfere with the judgments of one's heart and actions that are based thereupon. A view such as Mencius' raises two major questions. How does the recommendation to emancipate oneself from one's emotions relate to assertions made elsewhere that emotions are common to all of us? Secondly, how can someone who has freed himself from the burden of emotions still be moved to act? Is the emotion-free sage not doomed to be a cool and passive contemplator of things? If not, where can he derive the impetus for his actions? I will search for an answer to these questions in the Huainanzi. Griet Vankeerberghen