Emotions and Belief

Abstract

Intentional states, I have suggested, are to be understood in terms of belief and desire. Treatments of the intentionality of emotions, however, have almost invariably explained it in terms of beliefs, not desires. There are two related reasons for this. First, the desires most prominently related to emotions have been taken to have a resultant and secondary role. One is angry over some offense and consequently desires to retaliate. Also, evaluative beliefs or desirability judgments themselves have been supposed to involve or incorporate desires, which, for this reason, do not require independent attention. A man who takes another to have insulted him is supposed to think such treatment undesirable and so of course to desire not to be so used. I think that both of these assumptions represent serious misunderstandings about emotions and desires and in due course will argue that this is the case (see Chs. V and VI). For now, however, I will set these doubts aside, since I also think that beliefs are essential to emotional intentionality.