EMOTIONAL WITHDRAWAL: HOW KREMLIN WILL MAKE UP FOR LACK OF NEW VICTORIES

Abstract

(By Mikhail Komin. Slon.ru, May 12, 2016, https://slon.ru/posts/67921. Condensed text:) The Russian expert community, it seems, has already come to a consensus that the Kremlin is tired of playing at big wars and global standoffs, and is gradually returning to the bosom of domestic policy. This is evidenced not only by [Moscow’s] telling rollback of troops from Syria [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 11, pp. 3 - 6] or its de facto lack of participation in the new wave of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 14, pp. 6 - 8]. There was also [Russian President] Vladimir Putin’s most recent call-in show, where Ukraine and Turkey were noticeably less prominent than unpaid wages and unrepaired roads [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 15, pp. 3 - 6]. Then there was the Internal Affairs Ministry reform, the most significant redistribution of forces in the post-Crimean era. And there’s even a search on for a new economic program that can overcome the continuing decline of key economic indicators [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 17, pp. 3 - 7]. ... In the midst of such developments, coupled with local victories by the opposition in the struggle for fair elections, it has even become fashionable to talk about some sort of Putin spring - which, like the Khrushchev thaw, could mark a transition from the aggressive screw-tightening of the past two years to a more peaceful existence. ... The problem is that these screws turn effectively in only one direction. The strengthening of militaristic rhetoric, the besieged fortress mentality, hegemonic aspirations and the revival of former greatness were joyfully welcomed by the vaunted Putin majority: [These ideas] awakened something dormant - something internal and strong - driving the authorities’ approval ratings up to unprecedented levels. As we enter a big electoral cycle - the [2016] State Duma elections, followed by the [2018] presidential election - the Kremlin cannot let those ratings go down. ... All of these new searches for a way out of the economic quagmire, and attempts to give militaristic tendencies a bit of a breather, are reflecting right away on the index of confidence in the authorities. The level of dissatisfaction with the government’s actions is gradually returning to the pre-Crimean era. Yes, Vladimir Putin’s personal ratings are still very high, but even they are slowly and steadily slipping. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with the government, which broke the psychological barrier of 50% back in March, keeps stronger. ... Against this backdrop, the Kremlin’s domestic policy exercises cannot gain traction with the majority. The need for a new big, external shock is enhanced by two important factors. ... First, a two-year chain of events - [Russia’s] triumph in the [2014] Sochi Olympics, the bloodless return of the Crimea [see Current Digest, Vol. 66, No. 12, pp. я3 - 11], the exchange of sanctions [with the West], the Syrian gambit and the recognition of our country’s importance in the international war on terrorism - gave most people the impression that Russia was getting up off its knees. That illusory image has become so vivid and enticing that the average Russian does not want to part with it completely. Home-grown imperialistic nationalism is Russians’ natural reaction to almost every external shock - from the [1999] bombing of Yugoslavia to the [2008] war in South Ossetia. But the hegemonic hysteria of 2014 - 2016 was amped up so powerfully by [political] events and military successes that there is no going back to our previous position - unless we go through a painful withdrawal process. Such a withdrawal would be accompanied by great disappointment in the state and the existing regime - which the current elite absolutely could not allow, for the sake of self-preservation. ... The second important factor - which may not push the system to new military escapades, but will at least spur it to maintain the illusion of Russia’s participation in something very big and incredibly important to the whole world - is the continuing decline in living standards. ... According to the so-called Weber principle [referring to early 20th-century sociologist Max Weber - Trans.], the decline of individuals’ real social status makes them more susceptible to the influence of marginal ideas that emphasize their participation in something very meaningful. For example, nationalism and racism spread more quickly among the poor, since they serve to justify [people’s] low status and lack of success in life. People are uncomfortable blaming their troubles on themselves. They try to shift responsibility to circumstances, the outside world, other people, etc. - thus separating themselves from those others and compensating for their lower material status by artificially elevating themselves based on intangible standards and values espoused by them and the social group to which they belong.