Emotion regulation and evaluative understanding

Abstract

ABSTRACT Emotions can enhance our evaluative understanding by mobilizing directed reflection, but notoriously, emotional reflection can also lead us astray. If our goal is evaluative understanding, then we must make room for emotion regulation. Which forms of emotion regulation should we rely upon if our goal is evaluative understanding? In this paper, I distinguish between engaged forms of emotion regulation which keep us engaged with our emotional concern (e.g., certain forms of reappraisal) and disengaging forms of emotion regulation, which regulate emotional experience by leading us to direct attention away from the emotional concern in question (e.g., many forms of meditation). I consider but then reject the engagement view, according to which engaged forms of emotion regulation characteristically enhance evaluative understanding, whereas disengaging forms of emotion regulation hinder or detract from evaluative understanding. Against this view, I argue that disengaging forms of emotion regulation can play a vital role in enhancing evaluative understanding. I propose a practical model that can help us to decide when to rely on engaging forms of emotion regulation and when to rely on disengaging forms of emotion regulation, if our goal is evaluative understanding.