Abstract
Interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making, and the related phenomenon of emotion-based learning, has been heavily influenced by the Iowa Gambling Task. A number of psychological variables have been investigated as potentially important in understanding emotion-based learning. This paper reviews the extent to which humans are explicitly aware of how we make such decisions; the biasing influence of pre-existing emotional labels; and the extent to which emotion-based systems are anatomically and functionally independent of episodic memory. Review of literature suggests that (i) an aspect of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the IGT, but as a relatively unfocused emotion-based “gut-feeling,” akin to intuition; (ii) Several studies have manipulated the affective pre-loading of IGT tasks, and make it clear that such labeling has a substantial influence on performance, an experimental manipulation similar to the phenomenon of prejudice. (iii) Finally, it appears that complex emotion-based learning can remain intact despite profound amnesia, at least in some neurological patients, a finding with a range of potentially important clinical implications: in the management of dementia; in explaining infantile amnesia; and in understanding of the possible mechanisms of psychotherapy.
Highlights
Over the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al, 1994; Damasio et al, 1996; Rogers et al, 1999; Manes et al, 2002; Turnbull et al, 2003; Bowman et al, 2005; Peatfield et al, 2012)
We have argued that such emotion-based learning (EBL) systems may pre-empt or guide reason-based choice, when faced with settings involving combinations of a complex problem space; high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity; and laden or infused with affect
One form of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), but this is in the sense of an emotion-based impression: “How much do I like this object?” (Bowman et al, 2005; Evans et al, 2005), though this may explain why Bechara et al (1997) report that optimal IGT decision-making operates outside of formal cognitive scrutiny
Summary
Over the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al, 1994; Damasio et al, 1996; Rogers et al, 1999; Manes et al, 2002; Turnbull et al, 2003; Bowman et al, 2005; Peatfield et al, 2012). One form of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the IGT, but this is in the sense of an emotion-based impression: “How much do I like this object?” (Bowman et al, 2005; Evans et al, 2005), though this may explain why Bechara et al (1997) report that optimal IGT decision-making operates outside of formal cognitive scrutiny.
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