Emerging Challenges to Deterrence Stability in South Asia: A Theoretical Analysis

Abstract

The nuclear deterrent and conventional capabilities of both Pakistan and India contribute extensively towards maintaining peace and strategic stability in the region. In South Asia, both states have significantly increased their nuclear and conventional capabilities. The recent new trends, at regional as well as global levels, such as growing conventional asymmetry, changing policies of the non-proliferation regime, and the introduction of more sophisticated weapon capabilities pose a direct pernicious challenge to deterrence stability of Pakistan and India - as both nuclear states are immensely increasing their defence system. Through the lens of structural deterrence theory, this paper examines the strategic threats posed to deterrence stability in South Asia. Complete deterrence has become a mirage in South Asia. This paper examines the strategic imbalance in South Asia as the most pertinent threat - the two nuclear adversaries, India and Pakistan, are accumulating military power. This paper argues that strategic imbalance has serious implications for the South Asian region. In this paper, we employ the interpretative methodology.