Abstract
Spatially extended ecological public goods, such as forests, grasslands, and fish stocks, are at risk of being overexploited by selfish consumers–a phenomenon widely recognized as the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The interplay of spatial and ecological dimensions introduces new features absent in non-spatial ecological contexts, such as consumer mobility, local information availability, and strategy evolution through social learning in neighborhoods. It is unclear how these features interact to influence the harvesting and dispersal strategies of consumers. To answer these questions, we develop and analyze an individual-based, spatially structured, eco-evolutionary model with explicit resource dynamics. We report the following findings. (1) When harvesting efficiency is low, consumers evolve a sedentary consumption strategy, through which the resource is harvested sustainably, but with harvesting rates far below their maximum sustainable value. (2) As harvesting efficiency increases, consumers adopt a mobile ‘consume-and-disperse’ strategy, which is sustainable, equitable, and gives maximum sustainable yield. (3) A further increase in harvesting efficiency leads to large-scale overexploitation. (4) If costs of dispersal are significant, increased harvesting efficiency also leads to social inequality between frugal sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers. Whereas overexploitation can occur without social inequality, social inequality always leads to overexploitation. Thus, we identify four conditions that–while being characteristic of technological progress in modern societies–risk social inequality and overexploitation: high harvesting efficiency, moderately low costs of dispersal, high consumer density, and the tendency of consumers to adopt new strategies rapidly. We also show how access to global information–another feature widespread in modern societies–helps mitigate these risks.
Highlights
A public good that is freely accessible to everyone, while limited in quantity, can be used optimally only if consumers cooperate in using no more than their fair share
(4) If costs of dispersal are significant, increased harvesting efficiency leads to social inequality between frugal sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers
To explore the social dynamics of harvesting and dispersal in ecologically realistic environments, we examine our model for a wide range of parameter combinations corresponding to diverse socio-ecological settings
Summary
A public good that is freely accessible to everyone, while limited in quantity, can be used optimally only if consumers cooperate in using no more than their fair share. Those who consume more than their fair share obtain a greater benefit. This creates an incentive to overexploit the public good, which threatens to reduce resource availability, leaving everyone worse off. This social dilemma is called the ‘tragedy of the commons’ [1, 2]. Research into mechanisms capable of preventing social dilemmas can help inform important policy decisions, ranging from fisheries regulations and forest management to treaty negotiations on the global commons, such as ozone-layer protection and climate-change mitigation [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]
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