Abstract
In a recent paper Barnes proposes to characterize ontological emergence by identifying the emergent entities with those entities which are both fundamental and dependent. Barnes offers characterizations of the notions of fundamentality and dependence, but is cautious about committing to the specifics of these notions. This paper argues that Barnes’s characterization of emergence is problematic in several ways. Firstly, emergence is a relation, and merely delimiting relata of this relation tells us little about it. Secondly, the group of entities delimited as dependent and fundamental do not appear to be the group of emergent entities. Rather, some entities appear to be dependent and fundamental and not emergent, whilst other entities appear to be emergent and not dependent and fundamental. The moral drawn is that in order to provide a characterization of emergence one must go beyond what Barnes says explicitly. It is also shown that a potentially fruitful way of doing this would be to further specify the notion of dependence at issue revealing it to be asymmetric and perhaps merely nomological.
Highlights
Barnes’s Proposed Characterization of EmergenceTalk of emergence has arisen in a number of different fields, including sociology, biology, physics, and philosophy, and it has the potential to further clarify topics within these fields. For example, taking the mind to be emergent might help accommodate certain intuitions about physicalism and non-reduction
In a recent paper Barnes proposes to characterize ontological emergence by identifying the emergent entities with those entities which are both fundamental and dependent
Talk of emergence has arisen in a number of different fields, including sociology, biology, physics, and philosophy, and it has the potential to further clarify topics within these fields
Summary
Talk of emergence has arisen in a number of different fields, including sociology, biology, physics, and philosophy, and it has the potential to further clarify topics within these fields. For example, taking the mind to be emergent might help accommodate certain intuitions about physicalism and non-reduction. ( I will capitalise these expressions to be clear these interpretations are intended.) Barnes suggests they mark distinctions which needn’t coincide This gives us four ontological categories: the Fundamental Independent entities, the Fundamental Dependent entities, the Derivative Independent entities, and the Derivative Dependent entities. Barnes is hesitant to commit to these characterizations of Fundamentality and Dependence as analyses, because she believes that the notions are primitive.9 They do offer a clear proposal for characterizing emergence, which I will consider in the course of this paper. According to this view, referred to as ‘FundDep’, the emergent entities are the Fundamental Dependent entities. I will raise some concerns with FundDep
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