Abstract
Following a suggestion from G. Bateson, this article enquires into the consequence of the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind, taking seriously the notion of an ecology of mind. In the first half of this article, after distinguishing between the biological and the systemic approaches to ecology, I focus on three characteristics of the systemic approach. First, that a system is an abstract object that is multiply embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects. Second, that there is a form of circular causality between the level of the elements and that of the system as a whole, as some characteristics of the elements partake in the explanation of how the system functions, while the requirement of the system explains why the elements have the characteristics that they do. The third is the ontological uncertainty that we sometimes find in ecology, where the same term is used to designate both a central component of the ecological system and the system as a whole. In the second half, beginning with a critique of the theory of mind approach, I look into the consequences of conceiving that mind is embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects that interact as elements of a system, rather than enclosed in an individual body.
Highlights
“Steps” seems the right title for a collection of essays written over a period of more than thirty-five years, in which the idea of an ecology of mind only becomes an explicit theme in the last section of the book
What these steps recount is how Bateson, who was throughout his life “concerned by four sorts of subject matter: anthropology, psychiatry, biological evolution and genetics, and the new epistemology which comes out of systems theory and ecology”, progressively became convinced that ideas and mind cannot be studied and understood in isolation, but only as part of a larger system
Ecology is usually defined as the branch which studies how organisms interact with their environment and with other organisms
Summary
In 1972, Gregory Bateson published Steps to an Ecology of Mind [1]. “Steps” seems the right title for a collection of essays written over a period of more than thirty-five years, in which the idea of an ecology of mind only becomes an explicit theme in the last section of the book. The two meanings, though closely related, are not identical; while ecology in its biological sense focuses on the relations between an organism or species and its environment, the systemic approach centers on the complex system that organisms constitute together with their environment. Cognitive ecology views the cognitive traits of organisms as adaptations to different environments and seeks to understand the selective pressures that lead to different adaptations It is a sub-discipline of biology and clearly belongs to ecology in the first sense identified above. What image of the mind arises if we take seriously the idea of an ecology of mind in the systemic sense? What are the consequences of such an approach to the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind?
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