Abstract

The ability of virtual reality (VR) to recreate controlled, immersive, and interactive environments that provide intensive and customized exercises has motivated its therapeutic use after stroke. Interaction and bodily presence in VR-based interventions is usually mediated through virtual selves, which synchronously represent body movements or responses to events on external input devices. Embodied self-representations in the virtual world not only provide an anchor for visuomotor tasks, but their morphologies can have behavioral implications. While research has focused on the underlying subjective mechanisms of exposure to VR on healthy individuals, the transference of these findings to individuals with stroke is not evident and remains unexplored, which could affect the experience and, ultimately, the clinical effectiveness of neurorehabilitation interventions. This study determined and compared the sense of embodiment and presence elicited by a virtual environment under different perspectives and levels of immersion in healthy subjects and individuals with stroke. Forty-six healthy subjects and 32 individuals with stroke embodied a gender-matched neutral avatar in a virtual environment that was displayed in a first-person perspective with a head-mounted display and in a third-person perspective with a screen, and the participants were asked to interact in a virtual task for 10 min under each condition in counterbalanced order, and to complete two questionnaires about the sense of embodiment and presence experienced during the interaction. The sense of body-ownership, self-location, and presence were more vividly experienced in a first-person than in a third-person perspective by both healthy subjects (p < 0.001, = 0.212; p = 0.005, = 0.101; p = 0.001, = 0.401, respectively) and individuals with stroke (p = 0.019, = 0.070; p = 0.001, = 0.135; p = 0.014, = 0.077, respectively). In contrast, no agency perspective-related differences were found in any group. All measures were consistently higher for healthy controls than for individuals with stroke, but differences between groups only reached statistical significance in presence under the first-person condition (p < 0.010, η = 0.084). In spite of these differences, the participants experienced a vivid sense of embodiment and presence in almost all conditions. These results provide first evidence that, although less intensively, embodiment and presence are similarly experienced by individuals who have suffered a stroke and by healthy individuals, which could support the vividness of their experience and, consequently, the effectiveness of VR-based interventions.

Highlights

  • Classical definitions of embodiment have resorted to the concepts of corporeal awareness [1], bodily self-consciousness [2], and the sense of one’s own body [3]

  • The exclusion criteria applied to the stroke group included: first, severe cognitive impairment, as defined by scores below 23 in the Mini-Mental State Examination [45]; second, an inability to follow instructions, as defined by scores below 45 in the receptive language index of the Mississippi Aphasia Screening Test [46]; third, a risk of falling, as defined by scores below 45 in the Berg Balance Scale [47]; fourth, visual or hearing impairment that did not allow for interaction; and unilateral spatial neglect

  • Significant differences were identified between the healthy subjects under the first- and third-person conditions for body-ownership (5.41 ± 0.88 vs. 4.36 ± 1.39; F(1,76) = 20.473, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.212), self-location (5.43 ± 0.84 vs. 4.74 ± 1.47; F(1,76) = 8.553, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.101), and presence (5.49 ± 0.81 vs. 4.03 ± 1.24; F(1,76) = 50.973, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.401)

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Summary

Introduction

Classical definitions of embodiment have resorted to the concepts of corporeal awareness [1], bodily self-consciousness [2], and the sense of one’s own body [3]. Its neural mechanisms are unclear, it is hypothesized that embodiment operates both via automatic bottom-up and potentially conscious top-down processes to permit the establishment of sensorimotor maps of one’s body parts with respect to one’s body [5]. Previous research has identified different constitutive components of embodiment, including body-ownership, self-location, and agency [5]. An understanding of their dissociation is, uncertain [6]. Agency refers to the sense that one can move and control one’s own body

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