Embodied Cognition and the Causal Roles of the Mental

Abstract

Many embodied cognition theorists argue that cognition is grounded in, or constituted by, bodily and environmental processes (Embodied Cognition). Proponents of this view face the challenge of explaining why the body and environment are not merely causally, but constitutively, relevant. This is especially pressing because much of the support for Embodied Cognition comes from empirical evidence for the causal interrelatedness of bodily, environmental, and neural processes, which at least prima facie could equally support both hypotheses. In this chapter, Titus appeals to widespread commitments about the nature of mental processes to provide a novel response to this challenge. In particular, if one accepts both that mental processes are inherently content-involving (Semantic Efficacy) and that content is extra-cranially determined (Semantic Externalism), then one should hold that mental processes are constitutively externally determined. Hence, one should accept Embodied Cognition. Central to the argument is defending Semantic Efficacy. Titus suggests that giving up on Semantic Efficacy would require a radical re-conception of our own mental agency, and that doing so is not sufficiently empirically motivated. She argues that we should instead endorse Semantic Efficacy, and along with it Embodied Cognition.