Abstract
The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents has been firmly established: perceptions guide action but so too do actions influence what is perceived. While much has been said on the implications of this for the agent's external behavior, less attention has been paid to what it means for the internal bodily mechanisms which underpin cognitive behavior. In this article, we wish to redress this by reasserting that the relationship between cognition, perception, and action involves a constitutive element as well as a behavioral element, emphasizing that the reciprocal link between perception and action in cognition merits a renewed focus on the system dynamics inherent in constitutive biological autonomy. Our argument centers on the idea that cognition, perception, and action are all dependent on processes focussed primarily on the maintenance of the agent's autonomy. These processes have an inherently circular nature—self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining—and our goal is to explore these processes and suggest how they can explain the reciprocity of perception and action. Specifically, we argue that the reciprocal coupling is founded primarily on their endogenous roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. Furthermore, the coupling occurs first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent's organismic embodiment. Finally, we consider how homeostasis and the related concept of allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.
Highlights
INTRODUCTIONThe reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents is well accepted and there are many examples from neuroscience and psychology, e.g., canonical visuo-motor neurons (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998), mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al, 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Thill et al, 2013), and a variety of ways in which embodiment influences perceptual, motor, 1We here use the term agent to refer to any system that displays a cognitive capacity, whether it is a human or and artificial cognitive system, such as a cognitive robot
The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents1 is well accepted and there are many examples from neuroscience and psychology, e.g., canonical visuo-motor neurons (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998), mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al, 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Thill et al, 2013), and a variety of ways in which embodiment influences perceptual, motor, Embodied cognition and circular causality and cognitive performance (Varela et al, 1991; Barsalou et al, 2003)
The constitutive/behavioral distinction derives from the constitutive autonomy and behavioral autonomy of biological agents (Froese et al, 2007; Froese and Ziemke, 2009), especially those systems that exhibit the characteristic of recursive self-maintenance (Bickhard, 2000), capacities that reflect Varela’s and Maturana’s concepts of autopoiesis (Maturana, 1970, 1975; Maturana and Varela, 1980), organizational closure (Varela, 1979; Maturana and Varela, 1987), and operational closure (Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Stewart et al, 2010); see Figure 1
Summary
The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents is well accepted and there are many examples from neuroscience and psychology, e.g., canonical visuo-motor neurons (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998), mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al, 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Thill et al, 2013), and a variety of ways in which embodiment influences perceptual, motor, 1We here use the term agent to refer to any system that displays a cognitive capacity, whether it is a human or and artificial cognitive system, such as a cognitive robot. The constitutive/behavioral distinction derives from the constitutive autonomy and behavioral autonomy of biological agents (Froese et al, 2007; Froese and Ziemke, 2009), especially those systems that exhibit the characteristic of recursive self-maintenance (Bickhard, 2000), capacities that reflect Varela’s and Maturana’s concepts of autopoiesis (Maturana, 1970, 1975; Maturana and Varela, 1980), organizational closure (Varela, 1979; Maturana and Varela, 1987), and operational closure (Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Stewart et al, 2010); see Figure 1 In this view, cognition, perception, and action serve to support the autonomy of the agent, both in a constitutive sense and in a behavioral sense. The goal of this article is to argue the case that the reciprocal coupling of action and perception is founded primarily on their roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. The article integrates and builds on many quite disparate concepts, not all of which will be familiar to every reader; an introduction to many of these ideas can be found in tutorial texts (e.g., Vernon, 2014)
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