Abstract

Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to autopoietic-friendly enactivism) suggesting that body–world interactions constitute cognition. From an ontological perspective, however, constitution is a problematic notion with no obvious empirical or technical advantages. This paper discusses the ontological issues of these two approaches in regard to embodied AI and its ontological commitments: circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism. The paper also outlines an even more radical approach that may offer some ontological advantages. The new approach, called the mind-object identity, is then briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and with the embodied identity theory.

Highlights

  • Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered

  • The notion of embodied AI is not a settled one [1,2]. It suggests a connection between AI and a cluster of approaches loosely addressed as embodied cognition (EC)

  • I will briefly outline a more radical position and I will contrast it with two recent variants of enactivism

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Summary

Historical and Conceptual Roots of Embodied AI

The notion of embodied AI is not a settled one [1,2]. It suggests a connection between AI and a cluster of approaches loosely addressed as embodied cognition (EC). Computational limitations can be sidestepped as happens, for instance, in living organisms with limited neural resources In this weak form, embodied AI and EC are variants of functionalism and the body–world nexus has only a contingent role in instantiating functional processes. My point is that the body is just a physical object, which seems to be the case if one is a physicalist As a result it doesn’t matter whether cognition occurs inside or outside the head—functionalism works both ways as the parity principle confirms [34]. To overcome this dilemma between functionalism and non-trivial embodiment, I will suggest stepping forward and consider whether the external world has an even greater role. I will briefly outline a more radical position (identity with external objects) and I will contrast it with two recent variants of enactivism (sensorimotor direct realism and embodied identity theory)

What does Embodiment Mean?
The Massive Simulation Hypothesis
The Double-Edged Nature of the Parity Principle
Ontological Commitments
Epiphenomenalism
Embodied Zombies
Mismatching
Body-Ism
Vitalism
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