Elusive Impartiality

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers what implications a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality has for one’s religious beliefs and credences. It is argued that epistemic impartiality in the religious domain proves to be elusive for two reasons. First, a commitment to epistemic impartiality appears to be self-undermining, and arguably the best response to this self-undermining problem is incompatible with an unqualified commitment to epistemic impartiality in the religious domain. Second, the most plausible methods for identifying an impartial doxastic stance on religious matters require that one settle various questions that are themselves implicated in religious controversy. In particular, one must take a stand on questions concerning rational bias on religious matters, and these questions cannot be settled in a religiously impartial way. In light of this problem, it is far from obvious that religious skepticism is the attitude that best comports with a commitment to epistemic impartiality.