Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Abstract

List of illustrations Abbreviations Preface PART I: INTRODUCTION 1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior Carl Dahlstroem and Lena Wangnerud 2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash Soeren Holmberg and Bo Rothstein 3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries? Susan Rose-Ackerman 4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption Ann Towns PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING 5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior Anna Persson and Martin Sjoestedt 6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood Ulrika Moeller and Isabell Schierenbeck 7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa Michelle D'Arcy 8. Stability and Stagnation Anders Sundell PART III: POWER-SHARING 9. Democratic and Professional Accountability Carl Dahlstroem and Victor Lapuente 10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev 11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior Petrus Olander 12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES 13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government Philip Keefer 14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties Helena Stensoeta, Lena Wangnerud and Mattias Agerberg 15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government Andreas Bagenholm and Nicholas Charron 16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg Index