Abstract
Over the last decades, health care reform has been a central concern of economic policy makers around the globe. It is therefore a particularly interesting example for the application, and further development, of theoretical approaches to institutional change. Based on a brief overview of the literature concerned with such applications, the paper shows that a differentiated analysis of agency in health care reform, and in particular elite decision making and its determinants, is relatively underdeveloped compared to different strands of more structure-oriented approaches. Using examples from the comparative literature, some avenues are outlined along which such an analysis could proceed.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.