Elite party disunity negatively predicts mass partisan-ideological sorting

Abstract

Political parties often feature salient internal conflicts between elite members over the party's positioning on political issues. We consider the relationship between elite partisan disunity and an important element of mass partisanship: partisan-ideological sorting. We argue that the likelihood of a partisan being sorted on a political issue will decrease as the extent of within-party elite disunity increases because this disunity will make it more difficult for mass partisans to ascertain the dominant position in their party and hence undermine persuasion and switching processes. We test this argument using data from the 2009 European Election Studies and 2005–2012 Comparative Candidate Survey. Ultimately, we find that partisan-ideological sorting is substantially lower when party elites are divided on the issue. However, we find weaker evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism. Our findings raise questions about optimal party strategy.