Elite clientelism in Nigeria: The role of parties in weakening legislator-voter ties

Leila Demarest

doi:10.1177/13540688211030219

Abstract

Political parties in Africa and other developing countries are known to forge clientelist rather than programmatic ties to voters. Yet this does not mean that parties reward strong legislator-voter ties. In this paper, I argue for the case of Nigeria that lawmakers seeking to advance their political careers are incentivized to direct public resources to party members and senior party elites rather than serve their constituents in general. I draw on interviews with 8th National Assembly (2015–2019) lawmakers as well as quantitative data on MP re-election, targeted bills and motions, and the use of constituency development funds to demonstrate the predominance of narrow clientelism in Nigeria. I also place the Nigerian case in comparative perspective to argue that the extent to which legislators devote attention to constituents is likely to exist on a continuum, with the causes and consequences of this variation requiring further attention from scholars.

Highlights

African parties are known to show little ideological or programmatic differences, while mainly relying on clientelistic ties to voters (e.g. Erdmann, 2004; Wantchekon, 2003)
I rely on secondary sources and interviews with Nigerian 8th National Assembly (2015–2019) MPs to demonstrate that resources are important for party nomination, but generally not used for the purpose of constituency service
This paper has argued that Nigerian lawmakers have weak ties to their constituents and that political parties do not reward generalized constituency service

Summary

Introduction

African parties are known to show little ideological or programmatic differences, while mainly relying on clientelistic ties to voters (e.g. Erdmann, 2004; Wantchekon, 2003). Evidence from these cases appears to suggest that, in general, parties do seek out candidates that serve local constituent interests, but many lawmakers may not measure up to the challenge, in turn leading to high turnover. I rely on secondary sources and interviews with Nigerian 8th National Assembly (2015–2019) MPs to demonstrate that resources are important for party nomination, but generally not used for the purpose of constituency service.

Results

Conclusion