Abstract
ABSTRACT This article explores how elite bargains affect external influence over civil-military relations. It argues that opportunities for security assistance arise from fragmented post-war coalitions and negotiations among rival factions. In post-civil war Liberia and Sierra Leone, the role of security assistance reflected bargains struck by ruling elites to consolidate their authority. Politicians used external backing to maintain fragmented coalitions while neutralising threats from factionalised armed forces. Reliance on security assistance enabled external influence through conditioning aid, delegated control, and day-to-day interaction. These cases highlight the importance of examining internal politics to explain the effects of security assistance.
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