Eliminating epistemic rationality#

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper I argue against David Christensen's claim that epistemic rationality is indispensable. I have long held that reasons for belief, like reasons for action, are pragmatic. If so, then we can account for the rationality of belief without making use of the notion of epistemic rationality. There are different ways of doing this. If you are drawn to the idea that rationality is a matter of responding to the world in a good way, then a good theory for you is one on which the rationality of belief is assessed relative to what one's evidence supports. If, on the other hand, you are drawn to the idea that rationality is a matter of believing and acting in ways that make sense from within the agent's own perspective, then a good theory for you is one on which the rationality of belief is assessed relative to what the agent in fact believes. (This view is also a good fit for those who endorse a certain kind of radical skepticism.) Either way, epistemic rationality can be eliminated from our theorizing. We can do what needs doing without it.