Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Flexibilities From Electric Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Approach

Abstract

Electric vehicles (EVs) have been well recognized as a deferrable load with the flexibility to shift their energy demands over time. Although this one-dimensional flexibility has been extensively investigated both by research and industrial implementations, the expanding energy demand and the associated uncertainties still make the integration of a large population of EVs into power system reliably and economically greatly challenging. In this paper, we design an auction scheme via mechanism design to elicit two additional flexibilities from EVs, namely energy flexibility and deadline flexibility. An offline mechanism is firstly designed as a benchmark based on the famous Vickrey–Clark–Groves mechanism. Then based on the primal-dual approach, we propose an online auction, in which all bids are truthful, the loss of social welfare is bounded by competitive ratio, and the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time. By the numerical results, we quantitatively show that both the power system operators and individual EVs can benefit from the integration of the multi-dimensional flexibilities through our proposed mechanisms.