Elements and (first) principles in chemistry

Robin Findlay Hendry

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02312-8

Abstract

The first principle of chemical composition is that elements are actually present in their compounds. It is a golden thread running through the history of compositional thinking in chemistry since before the chemical revolution. Opposed to this principle, which I call Actually Present Elements (APE), is the idea that elements are merely potentially present in their compounds: although not actually present, it is possible to recover them. In this paper I follow that golden thread, and then discuss the status of APE itself: is it true? What arguments were there for it, and when? I argue that APE is a metaphysical principle, albeit at a lower level of generality and abstraction than the term ‘metaphysical’ usually suggests. I critically examine a range of different views on how metaphysical principles might be involved in research programmes in empirical science, and conclude by endorsing Elie Zahar’s view that metaphysical principles such as APE are to be found at the very heart of science. Moreover, they can be recipients of empirical support just like other parts of scientific theory.

Highlights

For very good reasons, it is quite unfashionable for historians and philosophers of science to attempt to identify, in sweepingly general terms, grand ‘research programmes’ in science, that stretch across centuries
Keywords Chemistry · Metaphysics · History of science. It is quite unfashionable for historians and philosophers of science to attempt to identify, in sweepingly general terms, grand ‘research programmes’ in science, that stretch across centuries
Here is what I take to be an illuminating sketch of the history of chemistry: from Lavoisier onwards, chemists were engaged in a compositional research programme whose central task was to decompose non-elemental substances and identify their component elements

Summary

Introduction

It is quite unfashionable for historians and philosophers of science to attempt to identify, in sweepingly general terms, grand ‘research programmes’ in science, that stretch across centuries. Dalton introduced a new form of atomism, which provided a metaphysical explanation of APE: for each element there is a distinct kind of atom, and elements are present in their compounds because atoms survive chemical change, and so are present in their compounds. This was an innovation: before Dalton there were no direct logical relationships between atomist assumptions and compositional theory. I conclude by considering the role of metaphysical assumptions in scientific research programmes

APE in the history of the elements

Early modern chemistry

Lavoisier

Dalton

Mendeleev

The twentieth century