Electronic Monitoring Is Not the Only Problem Here

Abstract

Over the past 25 years, few alternative sanctions have received as much attention as electronically monitored house arrest. In the view of relatively dynamic development of electronic surveillance technologies and related ethical and legal issues at stake, this interest continues to this day. In the Czech Republic, electronically monitored house arrest was introduced in 2010. Somewhat oddly, the electronic surveillance system had not been implemented at the time. Yet, legislators and sanctions policy makers placed high hopes in this form of punishment. In particular, it was expected to significantly help combat the relentless hypertrophy of the prison population. But the expectations of sanction policy makers were not met due to the reluctance of the courts to impose house arrest. This had remained unchanged over the years, and opinions had begun to emerge that the state's failure to introduce electronic monitoring was primarily to blame. In 2019, electronic monitoring was eventually implemented, but the number of sentences imposed still did not increase. If the legislature's sanctions policy is not translated into practice, its aims cannot be achieved. For this to happen, it is essential that house arrest becomes more prevalent in the structure of sentences imposed. Increased application rates will not happen spontaneously; certain steps need to be taken to address the reasons for the current state of affairs and to mitigate factors that negatively affect application practice. For this purpose, such causes and negative factors must first be identified. This paper therefore examines the importance of electronic monitoring in terms of the application practice of house arrest in the Czech Republic, and the main reasons for not imposing house arrest. Building on these findings, it offers suggestions that would contribute to more frequent imposition of house arrest in appropriate cases.